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I.  Introduction
Public housing represents a sizable subsidy to housing cost and it has to be strictly rationed
among competing users.  When rationing occurs, resources may not be allocated to their most
valuable  uses  because  people  cannot  effectively  convey  the  intensity  of  their  preferences.
Consider, for example, two otherwise identical housing flats available for allocation between
two prospective tenants.  Flat A is located in a more desirable neighborhood than Flat B, so
both prospective tenants are willing to pay a premium rent for Flat A.  Suppose the first person
also happens to work in the same neighborhood as the location of Flat A, and he is prepared to
pay a higher premium for Flat A than is the second prospective tenant.  In an open market, Flat
A will  be allocated to the person who values it  more,  namely the first  prospective tenant.
When  rents  are  fixed  at  subsidized  levels  and  flats  are  allocated  by  non-market  means,
however, both prospective tenants will  reveal (truthfully) that they prefer Flat A to Flat B.
There is no means to administratively determine which of the two is the higher-value user for
the more desirable flat.  In practice, subsidized housing is often allocated on the basis of stated
preferences supplemented by some lottery or queuing mechanism.  The purpose of this paper is
to study some of the inefficiencies induced by the use of non-price methods of allocation in the
provision of public housing in Hong Kong.  
The misallocation of resources under non-price methods of allocation draws from a
large and well-established literature in economics (e.g., Cheung, 1974; Weitzman, 1977; Suen,
1989; Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003).  When a good is allocated at below-market price, there is
insufficient  incentive  for  sellers  to  produce  the  good.   The  resulting  under-supply  of  the
subsidized good leads to the famous “deadweight  loss” illustrated in economics textbooks.
Less well recognized is the fact that competition for the price subsidy generally leads to the
dissipation of value.  Barzel (1974) shows how equilibrium can be achieved through socially
wasteful rationing by waiting.  In the context of public housing, prospective tenants may distort
their  labour  supply  decisions  lest  their  income  exceeds  the  eligibility  threshold,  while
incumbent tenants may choose to inefficiently stay in their flats upon changing circumstances
lest they lose the valuable subsidy.  Yet a third source of inefficiency is that, when individuals
cannot  express  their  intensity  of  preferences  through  their  willingness  to  pay,  non-price
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methods of allocation generally fail to allocate scarce resources to the highest-value users.  If a
flat worth a rental of HK$10,000 a month is being rented at HK$2,000, any prospective tenant
whose value for the flat exceeds HK$2,000 will be interested in bidding for it.  Depending on
the allocation method being adopted, the flat may well end up in the hands of someone whose
value for it is well below HK$10,000.  Deacon and Sonstelie (1989; 1991) and Suen (1989)
analyze the welfare costs arising from such misallocation of resources when rationing is by
waiting.   In a  more  recent  study,  Glaeser  and Luttmer  (2003)  study  the  misallocation of
housing  in  New  York  City  under  rent  control.   They  find  that  the  matching  of  the
characteristics of tenants to the characteristics of their housing units is distorted for flats under
rent control.  Since rent control also represents a housing subsidy to existing tenants, Glaeser
and Luttmer’s (2003) insight is equally applicable to the analysis of government-subsidized
housing.
In Hong Kong, public housing affects a large fraction of the population.  In 2009, 29
percent  of  the  households  were  tenants  in  government-provided  housing,  and  another  18
percent owned subsidized housing through the Home Ownership Scheme and related programs
(Hong Kong Housing Authority,  2010a).  Critics of public housing policy often focus on the
fiscal burden imposed by such massive subsidies.  Less well  researched are costs from the
allocative inefficiencies induced by rationing subsidized housing.  Although these costs may be
less tangible than the direct fiscal costs, they can have a more immediate impact on people’s
everyday lives.  In this paper, we focus on distortions on location choices induced by public
housing. 
Public housing benefits tend to tie down tenants to their current location; residents in
public housing are expected to be less likely to move to more convenient locations or more
suitable housing units even after their life circumstances have changed.  This hypothesis is
related to the literature on the “job lock” effect on job mobility (e.g., Madrian, 1994; Gilleskie
and Lutz, 2002; Adams, 2004; Bansak and Raphael, 2008).  That literature examines the effect
of employer-provided health insurance on job mobility, the hypothesis being that workers are
reluctant to switch their jobs lest they lose their insurance coverage.  In a similar vein, we
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examine the hypothesis that public housing benefits deter internal mobility because occupants
do not want to lose their substantial housing subsidy.1
In the urban studies literature,  there is a substantial  body of work documenting the
empirical patterns of internal migration (e.g., Greenwood, 1985; Elliott, 1997; Painter, 1997).
Boyle and Shen (1997) study the effect of public (council) housing on internal migration in
Britain and find that public housing occupants are less likely to migrate long distances outside
the area of the local council.   In a recent paper, Kim et al. (2005) demonstrate that transport
related attributes have significant impacts on residential location choice and individuals prefer
locations with a combination of shorter commuting time, lower transport costs, lower density
and  higher  quality  of  school.   In  the  United  States,  public  housing  complexes  are  often
clustered in central-city locations with high concentration of poverty (Quigley, 2000).  Many
believe that living in such neighborhoods limits one’s economic opportunity (Wilson, 1996).
To reduce economic segregation induced by project-based public housing provision, the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development has experimented with tenant-based rental
subsidies to encourage them to move from high-poverty to low-poverty areas (e.g., the Moving
to Opportunity Program).  Johnson  et al. (2002) report that families who take advantage of
these programs to move to low-poverty areas experience reductions in welfare dependence and
improvements in health status.  There is also evidence that such moves may improve children’s
schooling outcomes and reduce their problem behaviours (see also Feins and Shroder, 2005;
Ludwig et al., 2005; Rosenbaum and Harris, 2001).
In addition to the lack of internal mobility, another manifestation of the distortions in
location choices induced by public housing is the mismatch between place of residence and
place of work.  A competitive rental market solves the efficient assignment problem as housing
units go to their highest-value users (Koopmans and Beckmann, 1957).  The price system fails
to perform this function when rents for public housing units are fixed and the allocation of units
in excess demand is determined by non-price means.  Moreover, even when there is no initial
mismatch  between  place  of  residence  and place  of  work,  people’s  circumstances  change.
When circumstances (e.g., change to a new job) prescribe moving to another area, the lack of
1 If they want to move to another subsidized unit, the administrative hurdles and waiting time are substantial
because of the persistent shortage induced by below-market prices.
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mobility on the part of public housing tenants may hinder the optimal reallocation of resources.
The  determination  of  residential  and  work  location  is  a  well  researched  topic  in  urban
economics (e.g., Vickerman, 1984; Siegel, 1975; Simpson, 1987; Kan, 2002; Kan 2003).  Also
of some relevance to our present work is the literature on the “spatial mismatch hypothesis” of
Kain (1968).   Kain’s work was originally  related to how residential  segregation adversely
affected the employment opportunities of blacks in the United States (see also Holtzer, 1991).
Although residential segregation by race is not a major problem for Hong Kong, the fact that
public  housing estates  are  often located far  from centers of  economic activities  may have
implications for the mismatch between place of residence and place of work.
Moreover,  housing  tenure  also  plays  an  important  role  in  determining  residential
mobility and employment (e.g., Ioannides and Kan, 1996; Kan, 2000; Dohmen, 2005).  Battu
et  al.  (2008)  study  the  effects  of  housing  tenure  on  individuals’  job  and  unemployment
durations in the United Kingdom.  They argue that home ownership and public rental housing
impose more constraint on employed and unemployed, respectively.  Munch et al. (2008) argue
that home ownership has a negative effect on the unemployment risk and a positive impact on
wages.  Huang and Deng (2006) show that housing tenure has consistent but different effects
on mobility over time in China.   Helderman et al. (2004) argue that there is a decrease in the
effect of homeownership on residential mobility given a rapid rise in homeownership in the
Netherlands.  Munch et al. (2006) suggest that homeownership hampers the propensity to move
for job reasons but improves the chances of finding local jobs.  As the availability of subsidized
sale flats in Hong Kong is more restrictive than that of private sector, public home owners will
face  a higher  distortion in  location choice than private  counterparts.   This  may also have
implications for the mismatch between place of residence and place of work among home
owners.
In this  paper,  we  use  the  census  sample  of  Hong Kong to  examine  the  allocative
inefficiencies induced by rationing subsidized housing and how this misallocation affects these
tenants’  behaviour  concerning  internal  mobility  and travel-to-work.   The  empirical  results
suggest that public housing occupants are more immobile and are less likely to work in the
same district  or region as  their  place of  residence than their  private  housing counterparts.
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Moreover, conditional on moving, public housing occupants are more likely than their private
housing counterparts to have to move outside their original  district  or region of residence.
They are also less likely to work in the same place as they live.  Our conclusions are based on
probit regressions of mobility and travel behaviours on public occupancy status.  We try to
control for other determinants of such behaviours by including an extensive set  of control
variables in our regressions.  Many of our regression models are estimated using hundreds of
variables.   However,  we  cannot  exclude  the  possibility  that  there  are  some  remaining
unobserved differences across occupancy groups that affect mobility.  The empirical results
presented in this paper should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
II. A Brief Review of the Public Housing Allocation System
In  Hong  Kong  there  are  approximately  two million  people  (about  30% of  Hong  Kong’s
population) living in  700,000 public  rental flats provided by the Housing Authority (Hong
Kong Housing Authority, 2010b).  Public housing applicants or their family members must not
directly or indirectly own or co-own any domestic property.  Moreover, applicants are subject
to income and total net asset value limits as laid down by the Housing Authority.
The Housing Authority maintains a waiting list  of public rental housing applicants.
From this list, eligible applicants are offered accommodation in public rental housing estates.
When an applicant’s turn comes, the applicant will be given a maximum of three offers (one
option in each offer) of public rental housing in the district of his/her choice.  The application
will be cancelled if the applicant fails to provide acceptable reason for refusing all the three
housing offers  (Hong Kong Housing Authority,  2010b).   Public  rental  housing estates are
grouped into four broad districts, namely Urban, Extended Urban, the New Territories, and the
Islands.  Since there are insufficient public rental housing units in the Urban district that can be
allocated to all applicants, applicants can only choose one district from among the three non-
urban areas for their future housing allocation.  As of July 2010, there were more than 130,000
applicants on the waiting list (Hong Kong Housing Authority, 2010b).  The Housing Authority
sets a target of maintaining the average waiting time at three years.
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In  the  process  of  public  housing  allocation,  applications  are  processed  strictly  in
accordance with  the  application sequence  numbers  and the  applicants’  choices  of  district.
However, those who fulfill the eligibility criteria of the Express Flat Allocation Scheme may
have an earlier chance to be allocated public rental housing units.   There are also separate
criteria and allocation schemes for people affected by squatter clearance and public housing
redevelopment.
According to existing public housing policies, public housing tenants may apply for flat
transfer  under  various  situations  such  as  increased  family  size,  special  medical  or  social
grounds,  or  major  improvement  or  redevelopment  programs implemented  by  the  Housing
Authority (Hong Kong Housing Authority,  2010c).2  Whenever possible, eligible tenants will
be transferred to suitable flats within the same estate.  Tenants may also apply for special
transfer to another estate.  Due to persistent shortage of public rental housing units, even if a
tenant is eligible for flat transfer, the waiting time can be quite long and there is no guarantee
that the new flat will match the tenant’s preferences.
Besides applying for a public rental housing unit, eligible households can also apply to
buy subsidized flats through the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS).3  In setting the price of
HOS flats, the Housing Authority follows three guiding principles: (i) the mortgage-to-income
ratio should not be more than 40 percent; (ii) 50 percent of the flats should be affordable to the
target group; and (iii) flats should be offered at a 30 percent discount of market value.
Starting from the third year of occupancy, HOS flat owners may sell their flats in the
open market after paying a premium to the Housing Authority.  The premium is basically equal
to the prevailing market value multiplied by the discount enjoyed by the owner at the time of
purchase.  For example, if the prevailing market value of a HOS flat is HK$2,000,000 and the
flat was offered at a discount of 30 percent at the time of purchase, then the premium is equal
to HK$600,000.  Owners of HOS flats can also sell their flats to existing public rental housing
tenants.  In this case, the original HOS owner will not be required to pay the premium to the
2 In the past,  public  housing tenants could participate in the Tenant Mutual  Exchange Scheme, which would
arrange a maximum of four matches in order to enable them to exchange their flats.  However, the scheme ceased
operation in early 2006.  It should be noted that unauthorized exchanges among tenants are regarded as breach of
tenancy agreements, resulting in termination of their tenancies.
3 Due to the collapse of the property market, the government suspended the production and sale of HOS flats
indefinitely from 2003 onwards. 
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Housing Authority before selling the flat, but the purchaser will inherit the liability to pay the
premium should  he or she seek  to sell  the  flat  in  the  open market  later  on.   With these
restrictions in place, the secondary market for HOS flats is quite inactive.
III. Empirical Framework
The data set we use in this study is a random sub-sample of the Hong Kong Population Census.
Relying on information from the population census file, we compare the pattern of internal
mobility between public housing and private housing occupants.  A study of public housing in
Hong Kong (Wong and Liu, 1988) adopts a similar approach, but the focus of that study is on
the distortion in the level of housing consumption.  Wong (1998) elaborates this and other
distortions induced by public housing,  and makes a case for privatization.  By introducing
another dimension to the misallocation problem (namely, mobility and location choice), our
study adds to the debate concerning various policy alternatives such as privatization or private-
market rent subsidy.   Although housing tenure plays an important role in mobility, the cross-
sectional data set used in this study does not contains adequate information for more in-depth
analysis.  Hence, this paper should be read with this limitation in mind.
Because of a persistent shortage of subsidized housing, it is much more difficult for a
public housing tenant to obtain relocation to another public housing unit than for a private
housing occupant to move to another flat.  Moreover, it is often an unrealistic option for public
housing  tenants  to  move  to  a  private  flat  because  doing  so  entails  losing  a  substantial
government subsidy.  This is similar to the idea of the “job lock” effect in labour economics
(Madrian, 1994; Gruber and Madrian, 1994).  In the “job lock” effect, one may argue that the
value of health insurance provided by the employer is not a pure subsidy because of possible
compensating wage differences.  In the case of government housing, the low rental is indeed a
subsidy.   We therefore expect  the  “housing  lock” effect  on internal  migration to be  even
stronger than the “job lock” effect on job mobility.  We hypothesize that, other things equal,
public housing occupants are more immobile than private housing occupants (Hypothesis I).
We argue that public housing occupants are less mobile than private housing occupants
because the range of options available to them is more limited.   By the same logic, if we
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compare people who actually made a move, we expect to find that a tenant in public housing is
less likely to move to a unit that matches his preferences.  Therefore, conditional on moving,
we expect that public housing tenants are more likely than their private housing counterparts to
have to move farther away from their original district or region of residence (Hypothesis II).
Another distortion created by public housing is that public housing benefits tend to tie
down tenants to their current location.  When circumstances change, such as change to a new
job or having a baby, one may consider moving to live in another location.  Siegel (1975)
examines  the  relationship  between  the  home and  job  location  of  the  household  within  a
metropolitan area (see also Simpson, 1987).  However, tenants in public housing are less likely
to move to more convenient locations and their location choices may not accurately reflect their
true location preferences.  In an earlier study in the United Kingdom, Hughes and McCormick
(1987) show that public housing inhibits local movement for job-related reasons.  We therefore
hypothesize that public housing tenants are less likely to work in the same district or region as
their place of residence (Hypothesis III).
Similarly, the market size for subsidized sale flat is much smaller than that of private
sector and these subsidized flats  are often located far  from centers of economic activities.
When a household determines to buy a subsidized flat, the location choice may not accurately
reflect their true location preference.  Therefore, conditional on moving, we expect that owners
of public housing are more likely than their private home owners to have to move farther away
from their original district or region of residence (Hypothesis IV).  When compare with the
private sector, public home owners are less likely to move to more convenient locations.  We
therefore hypothesize that public home owners are less likely to work in the same district or
region as their place of residence (Hypothesis V).
 These hypotheses  are tested using probit  regressions on census  data in 2001.   The
census data set contains information about whether a household has moved in the previous five
years, and information about the past and present districts of residence.  Additional variables
such as income and education can be used to control for other differences between public and
private housing occupants.  However, there may be unobservable differences between public
and private housing occupants that affect our outcome variables.   Because we do not have
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convincing instrumental variables, it is difficult to tease out the direct effect of public housing
from the indirect effects induced by the correlation between public housing occupancy and
unobservable  variables.   We will  attempt to partially  address  this  issue  by  introducing  an
extensive  set  of  control  variables.   But  to  the  extent  that  there  are  important  unobserved
differences across occupancy groups that affect the outcome variables, the estimates from our
probit regressions cannot be given a causal interpretation. 
Suppose a dummy variable M is equal to 0 if a tenant has not moved in the previous
five years, and M = 1 if the tenant has moved.  The probability that M = 1 can be represented
by a probit  model  with M as dependent variable.   The independent variable  of interest  is
whether the tenant resides in public or private housing.  We also include  an extensive set of
control variables such as age, gender, education, income, spouse, household size, marital status,
employment  status,  dummy  variables  for  young  children,  and  industry  and  occupational
dummy variables.  Based on Hypothesis I, we predict the coefficient estimate for the public
housing tenant dummy variable to be negative and significant.
Suppose the dummy variable S is equal to 0 if a tenant has moved to a new district in
the previous five years, and S = 1 if the tenant stayed in the same district.  Then the probability
of S = 1 conditional on having moved in the past five years can be denoted by Prob(S=1|M=1).
This conditional probability  can be estimated using the sub-sample of households that had
moved in the previous five years.  Hypothesis II predicts that the coefficient estimate for the
public housing tenant dummy variable of this probit model is negative and significant.
Finally, let W = 1 if place of work and place of residence are in the same district (or in
the same region), and W = 0 otherwise.  Hypothesis III predicts that in a probit regression with
W as the dependent variable, the coefficient estimate for the public housing tenant dummy
variable is negative and significant.
IV. Empirical Results
The data set we use in this study is the five percent random sub-sample of the 2001 Hong Kong
Population Census.  We include all heads of households aged 18 or above who were born in
Hong  Kong,  Macau  or  Mainland China.   By  definition,  a  household  refers  to  a  housing
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domestic unit consisting of the members of a family who live together along with non-relatives.
Thus, the location choice of a housing unit affects all members of the household concerned.  In
this paper, when analyzing the location choices made by a household, we primarily focus on
the  choices  made  by  the  household  head.   Extending  the  sample  to  cover  all  household
members does not change any of our conclusions.4
Our  primary  objective  is  to compare the  mobility  and location decisions of  public
housing occupants with those of private housing occupants.  We make a distinction between
“Public Housing Tenants” and “Owner-Occupiers (Public).”  The former refers to tenants in
public housing rental estates, whereas the latter primarily refers to owners of subsidized HOS
flats.   Similarly,  we  make  a  distinction between “Private  Housing  Tenants”  and “Owner-
Occupiers  (Private),”  giving  rise  to  a  total  of  four  different  housing-tenure  types.   Since
mobility  and location decisions made (and constraints faced) by homeowners may be very
different  from those of rental  tenants,  we run regressions separately  for these  two distinct
groups.
(Insert Table 1 Here)
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of all households by housing-tenure type.  The
data set consists of 96,690 observations.  About 32 percent of these households were in public
rental  housing,  and a further 15 percent were owners of government subsidized flats.   The
characteristics of the household heads were quite different across housing-tenure types.  On
average, household heads of public housing rental units were older, less educated, more likely
to be female, and less likely to have young children than the other groups.  They were also
more likely to be unemployed or economically inactive.  As expected, household income for
public housing occupants was lower than that of their private housing counterparts.  In our data,
the average household income for public housing rental tenants was HK$15,258 while that for
private housing rental tenants was HK$24,344.  Similarly, owners of subsidized housing had an
average income of HK$24,965, compared to HK$34,521 for owners of private housing.
4 Since a  housing unit  is  consumed by all  members  of a  household  simultaneously,  including all  household
members in the analysis in effect gives more weight to larger households.  As the conclusions do not change after
expanding the data set, we choose not to present the empirical results in this paper.
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The population census file contains information about district of current residence as
well as the district of residence five years ago.  To present the geographical distribution of
housing-tenure types in Table 1, we aggregate the 31 census districts of Hong Kong into three
broad census regions as classified by the Census and Statistics Department: Urban Areas, New
Towns, and Other Rural Areas.  Urban Areas refer to District Council districts on Hong Kong
Island and in Kowloon.  New Towns include twelve new towns in the New Territories.  Other
Rural  Areas cover the remaining areas in the New Territories.   In Hong Kong, the  public
housing programme was commenced in 1954.  At the beginning, public housing rental estates
were built  in  urban areas,  notably  in Kwun Tong and Wong Tai  Sin.   As the  population
continued to expand, it reached a point when urban areas could not provide enough land to
build  adequate  housing  units  to  meet  demand.   To solve  this  problem,  the  Hong  Kong
government  started  building  new  towns  to  accommodate  the  ever  increasing  demand  for
housing.  As discussed earlier,  there are insufficient public rental housing units in the urban
areas that can be allocated to all applicants; only public rental housing units in new towns will
be allocated to new applicants.  A typical new town is made up of several residential areas and
each residential  area mainly consists of both private and public housing estate clusters.  In
2006, there are altogether twelve new towns and the latest one is located in North Lantau.  
From Table 1, we can see that about 51 percent of the sample households were located
in Urban Areas and another 44 percent were in New Towns.  Among public housing rental
tenants, the corresponding fractions were 48 percent and 51 percent.  For owners of subsidized
housing, approximately one-third of them lived in Urban Areas and two-thirds lived in New
Towns.  This pattern is  reversed for private housing:  there were far more private  housing
households in Urban Areas (28,990) than in New Towns (16,180).  Households in Other Rural
Areas only made up about  five  percent of all  households.   The fraction was even smaller
among public housing tenants (0.5 percent), reflecting the fact that there were very few public
housing rental estates constructed in rural places. 
A. Internal Mobility
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In order to test Hypothesis I, we estimate a probit model for the dummy variable M, where M =
1 if a household had moved within the last five years.  We estimate the model separately for
tenants and owners,  and the estimation results are shown in Tables  2A and 2B.  Model  1
controls for gender, spouse-present, years of schooling, household income, household size, age
group dummies, marital status dummies, activity status dummies, young children dummies,
and district level fixed effects.  Instead of reporting coefficient estimates, we report marginal
effects of the probit regression.
Because of the substantial differences in observable characteristics between public and
private housing tenants, we try to test the robustness of our results by introducing detailed
control  variables  into  our  regression.   Model  2  adds  industry  and occupational  dummies,
replaces the age category dummies by a fifth-order polynomial in age, and replaces the linear
terms for income and household size by 100 dummies for income percentile and 10 dummies
for household size.   This model  includes  a total  of over 400 independent variables  in the
regression and the full estimation results are not shown to avoid clutter.5  Model 3 is the same
as Model 2 except that it further controls for spousal characteristics.  It is estimated only on the
sub-sample  of  tenants  with  spouse  present.   Finally  Model  4  expands  on  Model  2  by
introducing age times gender times control variable interactions (we replace the age polynomial
by age group dummies in order to produce interaction terms).  This last model is estimated
using the full sample of tenants and it contains over 1100 control variables.
(Insert Tables 2A and 2B Here)
The effect of housing-tenure type on mobility is captured by the first dummy variable
in the Tables.  For example, the negative marginal effect estimate of −0.250 in the first column
for “Public Housing Tenant” in Table 2A means that individuals in this group were 25 percent
less likely to have moved in the past five years compared to rental tenants in private sector
housing.  The estimated effect is significant in the substantive sense as well as in the statistical
sense.  Notice that adding an extensive set of control variables and interaction terms does not
materially change the size or the significance of the estimated effect of public housing tenancy
5 Full regression results can be obtained from the authors.
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on internal mobility, as shown by the marginal effects of the “Public Housing Tenant” variable
in Models 2, 3 and 4.  These results are consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis I.
In the sample, 29.3 percent of public housing tenants had moved in the past five years,
while 60.2 percent of the private tenants had done the same.  If we use our probit model with
the basic set  of control variables (i.e.,  Model  1 of Table 2A) to impute the probability  of
moving for public housing tenants, the estimated probability turns out to be 29.3 percent, which
is the same as the sample average.  Assuming these public housing tenants all became private
housing tenants, the model  predicts that their  probability  of moving would change  to 50.9
percent.   In other words,  the effect  of public  housing explains two-thirds of the observed
difference in the probability of moving between public-housing tenants and private-housing
tenants; the remaining difference can be attributable to differences in their other observable
characteristics as specified in our probit model.
Table 2B shows that owner-occupiers of private housing are less likely to have moved
in the previous five years compared to owner-occupiers of public housing.  Buying a flat is a
major investment decision with high fixed costs.  Once a decision has been made, it tends to tie
down owner-occupiers to their current location.  It is therefore not surprising that the difference
in  estimated  marginal  effect  between owner-occupiers  of  public  versus  private  housing  is
smaller than that between tenants of public versus private housing.  Nevertheless the estimated
effect of −0.049 in Model 1 of Table 2B is highly significant statistically and is non-trivial in
the substance sense, as the proportion of owner-occupiers who had moved in the past five years
is only 36 percent.   These results are consistent with our prediction that owners of public
housing are more immobile than are owners of private housing.  This conclusion remains the
same whether we focus on the basic model with around 50 control variables or other models
that include a few hundred observable control variables.  Since adding spousal characteristics
or  interactions  (i.e.,  Models  3  and  4)  do  not  show  substantial  impact  on  the  regression
estimates, we will focus on the two basic Models 1 and 2 in the rest of this paper.
We can provide brief comments on the effects of the other control variables on the
probability of moving.  The gender of the household head is found to have small but negative
effect on mobility for renters.  However, this negative effect on mobility turns to be small
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positive effect for owner occupiers.  Age, on the other hand, has strong effect on mobility.
Generally, people in younger age groups have greater mobility than people in older age groups.
For example, the estimated marginal effect for people aged 18−25 of the basic model in Table
2A is 28.5 percentage points higher than that for people aged 61 or above (the omitted group).
This positive effect on mobility increases to 45.9% for owner occupiers (Model 1 of Table 2B).
With regard to marital status and employment status, we find that people who are married or
divorced tend to be less mobile than people who are single, and that the unemployed are less
mobile than employees.  
We also find that education and household income are positively related to mobility,
while household size is negatively related to it.   However,  the presence of young children
increases the likelihood of moving.   Based on the estimates in Model  1 of Table 2A, the
probability of moving for households with children aged five or below is 19.7 percent higher
than households without these young children, and the probability of moving for households
with children aged six to ten is 13.7 percent higher than households without such children.
B. Location Choice
Conditional on moving, a household may choose to live in a new district or stay in the same
district.   Since  Chinese  culture  encourages  people  to  maintain  close  family  links,  it  is  a
common phenomenon in Hong Kong that close relatives live in the same neighborhood.  In
many cases, different households of an extended family live in adjacent housing estates or even
in the same block.  In addition to the fact that people prefer to stay in familiar neighborhoods,
the cultural norm suggests that, conditional on moving, households prefer to stay in the same
district  of residence.   Since private housing tenants have the highest  flexibility  in  housing
choice, their behaviour is a good indicator of their true preferences.  Public housing tenants and
owners of subsidized housing, on the other hand, have limited freedom in choosing a housing
unit and their observed location choices may not necessarily reflect their true preferences.  In
this subsection, we only include in the sample those households that had moved in the previous
five years.  While Hypothesis I predicts that public housing occupants are less like to move,
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Hypothesis II predicts that, conditional on moving, public housing occupants are more likely to
move outside their original neighborhood.
Boyle  (1995) finds  that  in the  United Kingdom long-distance  migrants  (those  who
moved over 50 km) were less likely to move into council housing than other housing types.
This finding is  not inconsistent with our prediction because the geographical size of Hong
Kong is small and moves in Hong Kong are rarely over 50 km.  Moreover, one reason for
Boyle’s result is that local authorities offer limited opportunities for public housing to migrate
from outside the local area.  In Hong Kong, by contrast, the allocation of public housing in all
districts is under unified control by the Housing Authority.
In the estimation of this subsection, since we are restricting to households that had
made a move in the previous five years, the sample size reduces to 37,013.  Tables 3A and 3B
show a probit model of location choice where the dependent variable is an indicator variable S
for whether the household had moved within the neighborhood.  More specifically, for the first
two columns of the Table, we assume that the relevant “neighborhood” is a census district and
we set S = 1 if the household had moved to a new residence in the same district, and S = 0 if
the household had moved to a new residence in a different district.  Recall that in our data file
the territory of Hong Kong is divided into 31 census districts.  The largest district according to
this  classification is  Eastern  district  on Hong  Kong Island,  with  a  total  of  approximately
198,000 households.  The median district is Wan Chai, and it has about 62,000 households.
Census districts are the most detailed geographical subdivisions that are available in our data. 
(Insert Tables 3A and 3B Here)
In the first column of Table 3A, we find that the marginal effect estimate for “Public
Housing Tenant” is negative and statistically significant.  The estimate implies that, conditional
on moving, the probability of moving within the same census district is 5 percent lower among
public housing tenants than among private housing tenants. This result is consistent with the
prediction of Hypothesis II.  In column two, we add detailed control variables (Model 2) and
the estimated marginal effect for “Public Housing Tenant” becomes stronger (from –0.052 to
–0.077).6
6 We also run a probit regression with a full set of interaction variables and the results are essentially the same as
Model 2.  We choose not to report the detailed results in this paper but the full results can be obtained from the
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If we compare the behaviour of owner-occupiers (see column one of Table 3B), we find
that the marginal effect estimate for “Owner-Occupier (Public)” stronger than that for “Public
housing Tenant” as presented in Table 3A.  The probability of within-district move is 17.6
percent lower for owners of public housing than for owners of private housing.  This result is
consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis IV.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 3A and 3B, we check the robustness of our results by using
within-region move instead of within-district move as the dependent variable.  Here, a region is
defined in terms of the three categories of Urban, New Towns, and Rural  that we explain
above.   Note that a census region as defined here encompasses a relatively  large  and not
necessarily contiguous area.  For example,  a household that moved from one new town to
another may encounter a completely different neighborhood.  For this reason, we expect the
results to be weaker than those in our preferred specifications of columns 1 and 2.
Comparing column 3 to column 1 of Table 3A, we find that the absolute size of the
estimate marginal effect “Public Housing Tenant” is less than 0.01 and is no longer statistically
significant at the one percent level.  One reason for this result is that most of the public housing
rental units that are available for allocation are located in New Towns.  We discuss earlier that
there are very few public housing rental estates in Other Rural Areas, while units in Urban
Areas are mostly already occupied and unavailable for assignment.  As a result, the relocation
of public housing tenants is primarily within the New Towns region.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 3B, the marginal effect estimate for “Owner-Occupier
(Public)” remains negative and significant.  For example, the estimates in column 4 suggest the
owner-occupiers of public housing had a 14.2 percent lower probability of moving within the
same census region compared to owner-occupiers of private housing.  Although this effect is
weaker  than  the  corresponding  estimate  in  column 2,  the  magnitude  of  the  effect  is  still
substantial.  In short, the results presented in Tables 3A and 3B support Hypotheses II and IV.
One  alternative  interpretation  for  the  finding  that  public  housing  occupants  move
further conditional on moving is a simple threshold model.  Since the cost of moving is higher,
they only move when it is really worthwhile to move, and it is really worthwhile to move if the
authors.
17
optimal  location  is  very  far  from  the  current  location.   According  to  this  alternative
interpretation, public housing tenants who moved should live closer to their place of work,
assuming co-location of work and residence is one important determinant of optimal location.
However we do not find evidence for this.  Among public housing tenants who moved, 7.4
percent live in the same district as they work (the corresponding percentage for public housing
tenants who did not move is 21.3 percent).  Among private housing tenants who moved, 19.0
percent live in the same district as they work (the corresponding percentage for private housing
tenants who did not move is 10.2 percent).  These figures do not support the interpretation that
conditional on moving,  private tenants are moving to farther but  “optimal” locations.   We
discuss the relationship between place of residence and place of work in greater detail in the
subsection that follows.
 
C. Place of Work
Simpson (1987) develops a model in which residential  location and workplace location are
simultaneously  determined  (see  also  Siegel  1975;  Kim  et  al.,  2005).   In  this  paper,  we
hypothesize that, due to lack of choice, public housing tenants are less likely to find a housing
flat that is located close to their place of work.  Moreover, the choice of residential and work
location is inherently  a dynamic decision (Vickerman 1984).   The lack of mobility  among
public  housing  tenants  hinders  the  attempt  to  adjust  their  residential  location  when
circumstances  change  (such  as  changing  to  a  new job),  thus  increasing  the  chance  of  a
mismatch between place  of  residence and place of work.   In this  paper,  we focus  on the
decision of the household head.  Since unemployed or economically inactive persons do not
report a place of work, the analysis in this subsection excludes such individuals.  The resulting
sample size with valid observations for the “Place of Work” variable is 53,334.  We code the
variable W equals 1 if the household head lives in the same district (or region) as he or she
works, and W equals 0 otherwise.  The resulting probit estimates are displayed in Tables 4A
and 4B.
(Insert Tables 4A and 4B Here)
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The second column of Table 4A shows that public housing tenants are significantly less
likely to work within the same census district of their residence compared to private housing
tenants.  The estimated marginal effect shows that the probability is 5 percent lower for public
housing tenants than for the reference group of private housing tenants to reside in the same
district as they work, holding other characteristics constant.  From Table 4B, we find that the
estimated marginal effect for “Owner-Occupier (Public)” is also negative (minus 3 percent) and
significant.  In other words, owners of public housing are less likely to work within the same
district  than are  owners  of  private  housing.   Note  that  we already  include  census  district
dummies in our regressions.  Thus our result  is not driven by the fact that public housing
estates tend to be located farther away from centers of economic activities.  In other words,
even if we compare between two households residing in the same census district, the one who
lives in public housing (rented or owned) is more likely to hold cross-district employment than
his or her counterpart in private housing.
In columns 3 and 4 of Tables 4A and 4B, we define the dependent variable W in terms
of whether the household head holds cross-region employment.  The results are similar to those
in the earlier specifications.  Even after controlling for regional effects, occupants of public
housing are less likely to hold a job within the same region of their residence than are their
counterparts in private housing.  These results are consistent with the prediction of Hypotheses
III and V.
In a paper by Simpson (1980), he argues that a household residential location is also
influenced by the work location of the secondary earners of the household.  We therefore check
the  robustness of our  results  by  changing the unit  of  observation to be  the  spouse  of the
household head.  Since many household heads did not have spouses or had spouses who did not
work, the sample size is further reduced to 27,490.  Based on the specification of Model 2, we
find that the marginal  effect  estimates for “Public  Housing Tenant” and “Owner Occupier
(Public)” in the equation for same-district employment are −0.038 and –0.057 respectively, and
both are significant at the one percent level.  If we replace district dummies by region dummies
and focus on the likelihood of working in the same region, the estimated marginal effects
become  –0.056  and –0.066  for  “Public  Housing  Tenant”  and  “Owner  Occupier  (Public)”
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respectively and both are statistically significant.  Just like household heads, secondary earners
in public housing, rented or owner occupied, have a lower probability of working in the same
census district or region as they live when compared to secondary earners in private housing.  
V. Conclusions
In Hong Kong, public housing confers a sizable subsidy to a large fraction of the population,
and public housing units have to be rationed among competing households.  Studies on public
housing policy often focus on the fiscal burden imposed by such massive subsidies, but the
allocative inefficiencies induced by rationing subsidized housing are less well documented in
the literature.  This study investigates the hidden costs of public housing from the perspective
of the misallocation of housing units to tenants by examining how this misallocation affects
these tenants’ behaviour concerning internal mobility and travel-to-work.
This study makes use of the five percent random sub-sample of the 2001 Hong Kong
Population census to test the following five hypotheses:
(i) public housing occupants are more immobile than private housing counterparts;
(ii) conditional on moving, public housing tenants are more likely than their private housing
counterparts to have to move outside their original district or region of residence;
(iii) public housing tenants are less likely to work in the same district or region as their place of
residence;
(iv) conditional on moving, public home owners are more likely than their private housing
counterparts to have to move outside their original district or region of residence; and
(v) public home owners are less likely to work in the same district or region as their place of
residence.
We estimate probit  regressions on the census sample to test  these hypotheses.   All
empirical results are statistically significant and consistent with our predictions.  By identifying
the distortions in location choices induced by public housing, this study serves to improve our
estimate of the true costs of public housing policies in Hong Kong.  Even though these costs
are less tangible than the observable fiscal costs, they have a direct impact on tenants’ everyday
lives.  Policy makers should explore the possibility of introducing private-market rent subsidies
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(see,  for example,  Gruis  et al.,  2005 and Johnson  et al.,  2002) to achieve the objective of
providing affordable housing to the less well-to-do while avoiding many of the distortions due
to government-provided housing.  
Lastly,  we would like to emphasize that our conclusions are based on correlations.
While we have introduced extensive sets of control variables (sometimes totaling to around a
thousand variables) in order to control for observable differences between public and private
housing  occupants,  we  still  cannot  exclude  the  possibility  of  differences  in  unobserved
characteristics that may affect the outcome variables.  Even though economic theory suggests a
causal link between public housing occupancy and reduced residential  mobility,  the results
presented  here  cannot  provide  definitive  evidence  for  such  a  link.   In  the  absence  of
experimental data or convincing instrumental variables, a causal interpretation of the results
should be adopted with some caution.
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Summary Characteristics by Housing-Tenure Type







Age (Years) 50.60 56.11 46.80 47.45 48.70
Female 28.46 34.11 26.00 23.71 26.42
Household Income (HK$) 24,867 15,258 24,344 24,965 34,521
Years of Schooling 8.86 6.49 9.94 9.09 10.50
Household Size (Number) 3.17 3.29 2.71 3.55 3.11
Marital Status
   Married 72.49 70.02 67.07 81.22 73.89
   Divorced/Widowed 15.85 23.83 13.19 10.13 12.08
Employment Status
   Self–employed 4.06 2.90 4.11 5.25 4.61
   Employer 7.05 1.91 9.12 5.77 11.53
   Unemployed 3.58 4.57 4.56 2.80 2.43
   Economically Inactive 33.09 49.32 26.01 22.32 25.92
Age Group
   18 – 25 1.44 0.61 3.82 0.88 1.22
   26 – 40 26.24 13.47 34.27 31.44 32.02
   41 – 60 45.64 45.85 42.77 50.63 44.72
Children
   Age 0–5 10.97 6.87 12.19 13.74 13.07
   Age 6–10 14.21 13.60 12.47 17.36 14.32
Number of Households
   Urban 49,324 15,304 10,761 5,030 18,229
   New Towns 42,207 16,362 4,820 9,665 11,360
   Rural 5,159 162 2,055 48 2,894
Number of Observations 96,690 31,828 17,636 14,743 32,483
All numbers are expressed in percentages unless specified otherwise. 
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Table 2A
Probit Regression on Internal Mobility (Tenant)
(Moved in the Last Five Years)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Public Housing Tenant -0.25012 -0.23812 -0.24293 -0.2392
(0.00634)** (0.00664)** (0.00908)** (0.00670)**
Female -0.02427 -0.02513 -0.01883 -0.03157
(0.00601)** (0.00635)** (0.01224) (0.00965)**
Spouse 0.03339 0.01824 — 0.01626
(0.00853)** (0.01001) (0.01019)
Age — 0.30706 -0.14496 —
(0.06437)** (0.16482)
Age2 — -0.01386 0.00262 —
(0.00270)** (0.00653)
Age3, Age4, Age5 — Yes Yes —
Years of Schooling 0.00325 0.00187 0.00048 0.00288
(0.00070)** (0.00076)* (0.00117) (0.00077)**
Married -0.06968 0.0343 — 0.01585
(0.01023)** (0.01102)** (0.01117)
Divorced/Widowed -0.00517 0.05478 — 0.03407
(0.00982) (0.01068)** (0.01079)**
Self–employed -0.04578 -0.03193 -0.03925 -0.03569
(0.01284)** (0.01385)* (0.01668)* (0.01388)*
Employer -0.01268 -0.0137 -0.0074 -0.01193
(0.01152) (0.01354) (0.01726) (0.01365)
Unemployed 0.04068 0.01873 0.01693
(0.01162)** (0.01259) (0.01726)
Economically Inactive -0.00694 — — -0.01837
(0.00673) (0.01260)
Child (Aged 0–5) 0.19681 0.16921 0.12291 0.18497
(0.00930)** (0.00988)** (0.01205)** (0.00985)**
Child (Aged 6–10) 0.13687 0.11406 0.07788 0.12324
(0.00775)** (0.00829)** (0.00982)** (0.00824)**
Child (Aged 11–18) 0.03747 0.0246 0.01454 0.03212
(0.00680)** (0.00732)** (0.00908) (0.00730)**
Aged 18 – 25 0.28544 — — 0.30655
(0.01954)** (0.02435)**
Aged 26 – 40 0.1589 — — 0.18691
(0.00946)** (0.01133)**
Aged 41 – 60 0.01307 — — 0.04168
(0.00737) (0.00892)**
Household Size -0.04448 — — —
(0.00217)**
Household Income 1.26E-06 — — —
(0.00000)**
District Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spouse’s Years of Schooling — — 0.00104 —
(0.00113)
Spouse’s Age – Age5 — — Yes —
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Spouse’s Employment Status — — Yes —
10 Household Size Groups — Yes Yes Yes
100 Income Percentile Groups — Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies — Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Dummies — Yes Yes Yes
Gender*Age_Group*Household_Size_Group — — — Yes
Gender*Age_Group*Income Percentile — — — Yes
Gender*Age_Group*Industry — — — Yes
Gender*Age_Group*Occupation — — — Yes
Spouse’s Industry Dummies — — Yes —
Spouse’s Occupation Dummies — — Yes —
Chi–squared 8474.79 9824.87 6438.45 9830.46
Notes: reporting marginal effects, standard errors are shown in parentheses
* — significant at 0.05 level ** — significant at 0.001 level
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Table 2B
Probit Regression on Internal Mobility (Owner)
(Moved in the Last Five Years)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Owner Occupier (Public) -0.04921 -0.04013 -0.05295 -0.03848
(0.00613)** (0.00632)** (0.00742)** (0.00632)**
Female 0.03868 0.03242 0.02982 0.02814
(0.00659)** (0.00705)** (0.01192)* (0.01452)
Spouse 0.06394 0.0617 — 0.05758
(0.01208)** (0.01269)** (0.01291)**
Age — 0.40246 -0.23617 —
(0.08309)** (0.16506)
Age2 — -0.01872 0.006 —
(0.00348)** (0.00667)
Age3, Age4, Age5 — Yes Yes —
Years of Schooling 0.00627 0.0011 0.00068 0.00285
(0.00076)** (0.00086) (0.00119) (0.00087)**
Married -0.02495 0.02789 — -0.01314
(0.01396) (0.01399)* (0.01441)
Divorced/Widowed -0.0187 0.03545 — -0.01695
(0.01095) (0.01216)** (0.01199)
Self–employed -0.00235 0.02262 0.02984 0.01163
(0.01102) (0.01203) (0.01378)* (0.01192)
Employer 0.03454 0.04251 0.03971 0.03313
(0.00821)** (0.00984)** (0.01113)** (0.00979)**
Unemployed -0.05216 0.02525 0.00688 0.0329
(0.01440)** (0.01765) (0.02215) (0.01799)
Economically Inactive -0.07035 — — —
(0.00797)**
Child (Aged 0–5) 0.07197 0.07454 0.05853 0.10915
(0.00814)** (0.00881)** (0.00995)** (0.00875)**
Child (Aged 6–10) -0.00928 0.00979 0.00854 0.01882
(0.0069) (0.00756) (0.00837) (0.00738)*
Child (Aged 11–18) -0.02184 -0.00074 0.00016 0.00622
(0.00656)** (0.00725) (0.00828) (0.00707)
Aged 18 – 25 0.45878 — — 0.47586
(0.01871)** (0.02193)**
Aged 26 – 40 0.32126 — — 0.29733
(0.01019)** (0.01238)**
Aged 41 – 60 0.09853 — — 0.10967
(0.00910)** (0.01106)**
Household Size -0.03792 — — —
(0.00232)**
Household Income 2.48E-06 — — —
(0.00000)**
District Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spouse’s Years of Schooling — — -0.00032 —
(0.00117)
Spouse’s Age – Age5 — — Yes —
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Spouse’s Employment Status — — Yes —
10 Household Size Groups — Yes Yes Yes
100 Income Percentile Groups — Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies — Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Dummies — Yes Yes Yes
Gender*Age_Group*Household_Size_Group — — — Yes
Gender*Age_Group*Income Percentile — — — Yes
Gender*Age_Group*Industry — — — Yes
Gender*Age_Group*Occupation — — — Yes
Spouse’s Industry Dummies — — Yes —
Spouse’s Occupation Dummies — — Yes —
Chi–squared 10234.15 11751.81 8407.59 11236.44
Notes: reporting marginal effects, standard errors are shown in parentheses
* — significant at 0.05 level ** — significant at 0.001 level
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Table 3A
Probit Regression on Locational Choice (Tenant)
Moved within the Same District Moved within the Same Region
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 3
Public Housing Tenant -0.05177 -0.07712 0.00943 -0.0083
(0.00971)** (0.01020)** (0.00708) (0.00742)
Female 0.02882 0.02976 0.01777 0.02543
(0.00954)** (0.01014)** (0.00723)* (0.00753)**
Spouse 0.01181 -0.01526 0.03147 0.01193
(0.01351) (0.01570) (0.01057)** (0.01217)
Age — -0.09219 — 0.08133
(0.08958) (0.06633)
Age2 — 0.00469 — -0.00303
(0.00385) (0.00289)
Age3, Age4, Age5 — — — —
Years of Schooling -0.01249 -0.0107 -0.00591 -0.00369
(0.00115)** (0.00126)** (0.00091)** (0.00100)**
Married 0.00896 0.00247 0.00353 0.00253
(0.01487) (0.01633) (0.01137) (0.01247)
Divorced/Widowed 0.00447 -0.01387 0.01902 0.0071
(0.01433) (0.01512) (0.01070) (0.01147)
Self–employed 0.00421 -0.01207 0.01749 0.01944
(0.02095) (0.02212) (0.01555) (0.01617)
Employer 0.03424 0.03208 0.01469 0.02573
(0.01639)* (0.01924) (0.01216) (0.01364)
Unemployed -0.00104 -0.00428 -0.02317 —
(0.01721) (0.01922) (0.01397)
Economically Inactive 0.01382 — -0.00254 0.01504
(0.01093) (0.00871) (0.01448)
Child (Aged 0–5) -0.04096 -0.04716 -0.01845 -0.02862
(0.01211)** (0.01309)** -0.00966 (0.01068)**
Child (Aged 6–10) 0.02242 0.01399 0.01561 0.00955
(0.01107)* (0.01202) -0.00845 (0.00922)
Child (Aged 11–18) 0.0309 0.02034 0.02384 0.01506
(0.01092)** (0.01181) (0.00843)** (0.00916)
Aged 18 – 25 -0.16247 — -0.11112 —
(0.02276)** (0.02288)**
Aged 26 – 40 -0.11408 — -0.0677 —
(0.01428)** (0.01236)**
Aged 41 – 60 -0.0456 — -0.03128 —
(0.01267)** (0.01056)**
Household Size 0.02377 — 0.00612 —
(0.00356)** (0.00285)*
Household Income -4.20E-07 — -1.48E-07 —
(0.00000)* (0.00000) 
10 Household Size Groups — Yes — Yes
100 Income Percentile Groups — Yes — Yes
District Dummies Yes Yes — —
Region Dummies — — Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi–squared 1835.31 2232.52 1202.21 1494.44
Notes: reporting marginal effects, standard errors are shown in parentheses
* — significant at 0.01 level ** — significant at 0.001 level
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Table 3B
Probit Regression on Locational Choice (Owner)
Moved within the Same District Moved within the Same Region
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 3
Owner Occupier (Public) -0.17604 -0.18913 -0.13521 -0.14221
(0.00972)** (0.00992)** (0.00852)** (0.00907)**
Female 0.02216 0.02613 0.01157 0.0113
(0.01072)* (0.01159)* (0.00905) (0.00972)
Spouse -0.01362 -0.01999 -0.00116 -0.01529





Age3, Age4, Age5 — — — —
Years of Schooling -0.00865 -0.00508 -0.0054 -0.00375
(0.00139)** (0.00163)** (0.00121)** (0.00141)**
Married -0.02869 -0.02809 -0.01069 -0.00966
(0.02423) (0.02495) (0.02042) (0.02088)
Divorced/Widowed -0.07626 -0.07054 0.01082 0.01122
(0.01858)** (0.01977)** (0.01702) (0.01783)
Self–employed 0.00493 0.00313 -0.00823 -0.0042
(0.01934) (0.02048) (0.01718) (0.01796)
Employer 0.00519 0.02709 -0.01168 0.00195
(0.01315) (0.01580) (0.01182) (0.01354)
Unemployed -0.01627 0.01412 0.01716
(0.02867) (0.02535) (0.02861)
Economically Inactive -0.01757 -0.00209 -0.02118
(0.01627) (0.03294) (0.01496)
Child (Aged 0–5) -0.00571 -0.02085 -0.00897 -0.00803
(0.01203) (0.01331) (0.01046) (0.01174)
Child (Aged 6–10) 0.03891 0.03147 0.02173 0.02228
(0.01192)** (0.01295)* (0.01008)* (0.01095)*
Child (Aged 11–18) 0.12233 0.1099 0.0829 0.08126
(0.01252)** (0.01342)** (0.00970)** (0.01042)**
Aged 18 – 25 0.10000 0.08809
(0.03467)** (0.02345)**
Aged 26 – 40 -0.04623 -0.00367
(0.02033)* (0.01781)
Aged 41 – 60 0.00851 0.01155
(0.01939) (0.01695)
Household Size 0.02731 0.02025
(0.00422)** (0.00371)**
Household Income -1.08E-06 -6.45E-07
(0.00000)** (0.00000)**
10 Household Size Groups — Yes — Yes
100 Income Percentile Groups — Yes — Yes
District Dummies Yes Yes — —
Region Dummies — — Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi–squared 2848.37 3095.49 1412.09 1653.04
Notes: reporting marginal effects, standard errors are shown in parentheses
* — significant at 0.01 level ** — significant at 0.001 level
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Table 4A
Probit Regression on Place of Work (Tenant)
Worked within the Same District Worked within the Same Region
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 3
Public Housing Tenant -0.03068 -0.0519 -0.02304 -0.04555
(0.00838)** (0.00878)** (0.00795)** (0.00831)**
Female 0.09492 0.07591 0.0747 0.06337
(0.00898)** (0.00980)** (0.00828)** (0.00921)**
Spouse -0.02913 -0.01816 0.00285 0.00295
(0.01290)* (0.01407) (0.01344) (0.01484)
Age — 0.03529 — 0.07525
(0.09870) (0.10670)
Age2 — -0.00251 — -0.00349
(0.00439) (0.00476)
Age3, Age4, Age5 — Yes — Yes
Years of Schooling -0.01222 -0.00863 -0.00459 -0.00287
(0.00104)** (0.00120)** (0.00109)** (0.00128)*
Married 0.05718 0.06291 0.0082 0.02173
(0.01344)** (0.01393)** (0.01523) (0.01632)
Divorced/Widowed 0.04353 0.0471 0.02322 0.02361
(0.01431)** (0.01538)** (0.01408) (0.01498)
Self–employed 0.12247 0.10937 0.05155 0.05318
(0.01487)** (0.01577)** (0.01310)** (0.01386)**
Employer 0.10377 0.13117 0.04398 0.07385
(0.01331)** (0.01591)** (0.01196)** (0.01308)**
Child (Aged 0–5) -0.037 -0.02924 -0.03005 -0.03248
(0.00994)** (0.01073)** (0.01073)** (0.01156)**
Child (Aged 6–10) -0.02191 -0.01191 -0.00056 -0.00104
(0.00851)* (0.00936) (0.00883) (0.00969)
Child (Aged 11–18) -0.00575 0.0004 -0.01253 -0.01636
(0.00791) (0.00865) (0.00830) (0.00910)
Aged 18 – 25 -0.03603 — -0.05423 —
(0.02131) (0.02583)*
Aged 26 – 40 -0.07039 — -0.05819 —
(0.01248)** (0.01485)**
Aged 41 – 60 -0.03402 — -0.03915 —
(0.01165)** (0.01290)**
Household Size 0.0104 — 0.00693 —
(0.00321)** (0.00337)*
Household Income -1.19E-06 — -4.99E-07 —
(0.00000)** (0.00000)**
10 Household Size Groups — Yes — Yes
100 Income Percentile Groups — Yes — Yes
District Dummies Yes Yes — —
Region Dummies — — Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi–squared 1545.96 2657.75 2506.46 3299.26
Notes: reporting marginal effects, standard errors are shown in parentheses
* — significant at 0.01 level ** — significant at 0.001 level
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Table 4B
Probit Regression on Place of Work (Owner)
Worked within the Same District Worked within the Same Region
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 3
Owner Occupier (Public) -0.03021 -0.03329 -0.03573 -0.04247
(0.00615)** (0.00622)** (0.00672)** (0.00693)**
Female 0.07341 0.05775 0.06144 0.05207
(0.00743)** (0.00786)** (0.00774)** (0.00845)**
Spouse -0.02269 -0.01411 -0.02357 -0.01745
(0.01414) (0.01441) (0.01692) (0.01769)
Age — -0.01774 — 0.11978
(0.10455) (0.13653)
Age2 — 0.00162 — -0.00598
(0.00457) (0.00609)
Age3, Age4, Age5 — Yes — Yes
Years of Schooling -0.01287 -0.00744 -0.0087 -0.00495
(0.00085)** (0.00101)** (0.00105)** (0.00128)**
Married 0.05309 0.04364 0.04812 0.0401
(0.01344)** (0.01377)** (0.01878)* (0.01907)*
Divorced/Widowed 0.05924 0.04544 0.06885 0.05981
(0.01368)** (0.01400)** (0.01407)** (0.01495)**
Self–employed 0.162 0.13778 0.09429 0.08631
(0.01220)** (0.01277)** (0.01138)** (0.01223)**
Employer 0.11067 0.11339 0.05579 0.06766
(0.00834)** (0.00997)** (0.00857)** (0.00994)**
Child (Aged 0–5) -0.02205 -0.02654 -0.01667 -0.02673
(0.00738)** (0.00782)** (0.00899) (0.00998)**
Child (Aged 6–10) -0.0029 -0.00508 -0.00086 -0.00692
(0.00661) (0.00710) (0.00797) (0.00878)
Child (Aged 11–18) -0.00175 -0.0055 0.01318 0.0023
(0.00633) (0.00685) (0.00777) (0.00860)
Aged 18 – 25 -0.03419 — -0.00304 —
(0.02109) (0.02794)
Aged 26 – 40 -0.06209 — -0.03435 —
(0.01146)** (0.01599)*
Aged 41 – 60 -0.04809 — -0.0239 —
(0.01113)** (0.01526)
Household Size 0.01893 — 0.01247 —
(0.00238)** (0.00294)**
Household Income -1.15E-06 — -5.34E-07 —
(0.00000)** (0.00000)**
10 Household Size Groups — Yes — Yes
100 Income Percentile Groups — Yes — Yes
District Dummies Yes Yes — —
Region Dummies — — Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi–squared 3135.42 4173.88 6100.46 6789.53
Notes: reporting marginal effects, standard errors are shown in parentheses
* — significant at 0.01 level ** — significant at 0.001 level
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